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Abstract
The Working Group on aggression has tackled both main issues referred to in article 5 of the
Rome Statute and Resolution F, namely the definition of the crime and the conditions of exercise
of jurisdiction by the Court. For some participants these two issues are closely interrelated to the
point that one cannot be considered without the other. Without prejudice to the substance of this
view, in practice, a separate debate has taken place to allow an orderly discussion of each aspect
of the problem.
Discussions during and after Rome demonstrate that there is no easy solution to any of the prob-
lems raised. In light of the difficulties to be faced, some continue to argue that aggression should
have never been included in the Statute in the first place. Whether they are right or wrong is ir-
relevant today. The Statute has been adopted and will soon enter into force. The international
community needs now to act upon decisions that were made at the Rome Conference both to in-
clude the crime and to mandate the PrepCom to draft proposals with the view of implementing this
inclusion at a review conference. All those who promote the establishment of a universal Court,
regardless of their position with regard to the crime of aggression, are required to negotiate in good
faith in order to seek an adequate answer to the problem. Failure to do so could undermine the
credibility of the process and weaken support for the Court.
THE WORKING GROUP ON AGGRESSION AT
THE PREPARATORY COMMISSION FOR
THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT
Silvia A. Femdndez de Gurmendi*
INTRODUCTION
At the end of the Rome Conference, after extensive discus-
sions, proponents and opponents of the inclusion of aggression
within the jurisdiction of the Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court' ("Rome Statute") had to admit that negotia-
tions had ended in a tie and accepted a "codified impasse."2 Ag-
gression would be included within the crimes of jurisdiction of
the International Criminal Court ("ICC" or "Court") but without
immediate effect due to a provision stipulating that:
The Court shall exercise jurisdiction over the crime of aggres-
sion once a provision is adopted in accordance with articles
121 and 123 defining the crime and setting out the condi-
tions under which the Court shall exercise jurisdiction with
respect to this crime. Such a provision shall be consistent
with the relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Na-
tions.'
As part of the compromise, the mandate of the Preparatory
Commission ("PrepCom") was enlarged to make sure that efforts
on the subject would continue immediately after the end of the
Conference. To that end, Resolution F adopted at the Confer-
ence on July 17, 1998 stated that:
The Commission shall prepare proposals for a provision on
aggression, including the definition and Elements of Crimes
* Diplomat; Deputy Legal Adviser of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Argentina;
Coordinator of the Working Group on Aggression of the Preparatory Commission for
the International Criminal Court. The views are expressed by the author in her per-
sonal capacity and do not necessarily reflect the views of her Government.
1. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9*
(1998), available at http://www.un.org/law/icc/statute/romefra.htm [hereinafter
Rome Statute].
2. M. Shuster, The Rome Statute of an International Criminal Court and the Crime of
Aggression: A Gordian Knot in Search of a Sword, School of Legal Studies, University of
Sussex, Summer 2001.
3. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 5, para. 2.
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of aggression and the conditions under which the Interna-
tional Criminal Court shall exercise its jurisdiction with re-
gard to this crime. The Commission shall submit such pro-
posals to the Assembly of States Parties at a Review Confer-
ence, with a view to arriving at an acceptable provision on the
crime of aggression for inclusion in this Statute. The provi-
sions relating to the crime of aggression shall enter into force
for the States Parties in accordance with the relevant provi-
sions of this Statute.4
In fulfillment of this mandate, the PrepCom established a
Working Group on aggression to deal with the matter.
I. THE SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES
The Working Group on aggression has tackled both main
issues referred to in article 5 of the Rome Statute and Resolution
F, namely the definition of the crime and the conditions of exer-
cise ofjurisdiction by the Court. For some participants these two
issues are closely interrelated to the point that one cannot be
considered without the other. Without prejudice to the sub-
stance of this view, in practice, a separate debate has taken place
to allow an orderly discussion of each aspect of the problem.
The results of early discussions are reflected in the consoli-
dated text that was produced by the former coordinator' of the
Working Group at the third session of the PrepCom in 1999.6
The text is a compilation of written and oral proposals and has
numerous brackets and options to show disagreement. Since
the elaboration of this document, additional proposals and
working documents have been introduced by individual delega-
tions that have fueled the debate and helped the Working
Group to move forward in the understanding of the problems.
4. Final Act of the United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on
the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, Res. F, para. 7, U.N. Doc. A/
CONF.183/10* (1998), available at http://www.un.org/law/icc/statute/final.htm.
5. Tuvako Manongi from Tanzania.
6. For the Proceedings of the Preparatory Commission at its first, second, and
third sessions, see Proceedings of the Preparatory Commission at its first, second and third ses-
sions, U.N. Doc. PCNICC/1999/L.5/Rev.1 (Dec. 22, 1999). For the most recent Con-
solidated Text of Proposals on the crime of aggression prepared by the coordinator, see
Proceedings of the Preparatory Commission at its eighth Session, U.N. Doc. PCNICC/2001/
L.3/Rev.1 (Oct. 11, 2001) [hereinafter Consolidated Text by Coordinator].
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A. The Definition
The International Law Commission ("ILC") included ag-
gression in its Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court,
but, as was the case for the other crimes, did not provide a defi-
nition.7 In the commentary to the draft, the ILC acknowledged
the special problem that was raised by this crime in that there
was no treaty definition comparable to genocide.8 Furthermore,
General Assembly Resolution 3314 of December 14, 1974 dealt
with aggression by States, not with the crimes of individuals, and
was designed as a guide for the Security Council not as a defini-
tion for judicial use.9 But, the ILC concluded:
[G]iven the provisions of Article 2.(4) of the Charter of the
United Nations, that resolution offers some guidance, and a
court must, today, be in a better position to define the cus-
tomary law crime of aggression than was the Nfirnberg Tribu-
nal in 1946. It would thus seem retrogressive to exclude indi-
vidual criminal responsibility for aggression (in particular,
acts directly associated with the waging of a war of aggression)
50 years after Nfirnberg.10
During the negotiations of the Rome Statute many.delega-
tions quoted this ILC statement and shared the historical assess-
ment of the Commission; that it would be retrogressive to ex-
clude individual criminal responsibility for aggression fifty years
after Nuremberg and the crime was indeed included at the end
of the Diplomatic Conference." Unfortunately, however, the in-
ternational community was not in a better position to define the
crime and all efforts to that effect failed in Rome. 12 Delegations
continue to meet enormous difficulties at the PrepCom in find-
7. Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Forty-sixth Session, Draft
Statute for an International Criminal Court, U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess., Supp. No. 10, at 70,
art. 20(b), U.N. Doc. A/49/10 (1994) [hereinafter Draft ILC Statute].
8. See id. at 72, para. 6.
9. See Definition ofAggression, G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX), U.N. GAOR, 6th Comm., 29th
Sess., 2319th plen. mtg. (1974) [hereinafter Definition].
10. Draft ILC Statute, supra note 7, at 72, para. 6.
11. See e.g., Report of the Preparatory Committee on the Establishment of an International
Criminal Court, U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess., Supp. No. 22, Vol. I, para. 66, U.N. Doc. A/51/
22 (1996).
12. For a story of the negotiations at the Rome Conference, see Herman von He-
bel & Darryl Robinson, Crimes Within the Jurisdiction of the Court, in THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT: THE MAKING OF THE ROME STATUTE, ISSUES, NEGOTIATIONS, RESULTS
79-127 (Roy S. Lee ed., 1999).
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ing common ground and several options remained open at the
time this paper was written.
1. The Precedents
Proposals introduced by delegations draw inspiration from
existing precedents, namely the Charter of the International Mil-
itary Tribunal of Nuremberg"3 ("Charter") and General Assem-
bly Resolution 3314.1'
Article 6(a) of the Charter provided for the individual crim-
inal responsibility for crimes against peace: "namely, planning,
preparation, initiation or waging of a war of aggression, or a war
in violation of international treaties, agreements or assurances,
or participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the accom-
plishment of any of the foregoing."1"
On the basis of this provision, the Tribunal found twelve
defendants guilty of having committed crimes against peace and
famously proclaimed:
The charges in the Indictment that the defendants planned
and waged aggressive wars are charges of the utmost gravity
.... To initiate a war of aggression, therefore, is not only an
international crime; it is the supreme international crime dif-
fering only from other war crimes in that it contains within
itself the accumulated evil of the whole.' 6
Efforts to sanction the crime on aggression were increased
by the International Military Tribunal for the Far East ("Tokyo
Tribunal"), which focused predominantly on the prosecution of
perpetrators of the crime against peace. On this crime, the To-
kyo Tribunal concluded that there had been a conspiracy to
wage aggressive wars and that the conspiracy had led to aggres-
sive wars against a number of countries. 7 Like the Nuremberg
Tribunal, the Tokyo Tribunal relied heavily on the Pact of Paris
13. Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Aug. 8, 1945, available at http:/
/www.yale.edu/lawweb/Avalon/imt/proc/imtconst.htm [hereinafter Charter].
14. Definition, supra note 9.
15. Charter, supra note 13, art. 6(a).
16. Judicial Decisions, International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg), Judgment and
Sentences, Oct. 1, 1946, 41 AM.J. INT'L L. 172, 186 (1947).
17. The Tokyo Judgment, Volume I, Findings on Counts of Indictment (B.V.A. R61ing &
C.F. Riter eds., 1977) [hereinafter Findings], reprinted in 1 BENJAMIN FERENCZ, AN INTER-
NATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, A STEP TOWARDS WORLD PEACE: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY
AND ANALYSIS 506 (1980) [hereinafter FERENCZ].
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of 1928 for the legal basis for the crime against peace.18 A total
of twenty-four persons were convicted of aggression. Among the
separate and dissenting opinions, Judges R61ing of the Nether-
lands and Pal from India objected that aggression had not been
defined yet as crime under international law for the purposes of
ensuring individual criminal responsibility. 9 Both made a call
to the international community to take the necessary legal mea-
sures in the future, in light of the horrors of the Second World
War.20
The efforts towards this end started immediately after the
war in 1946. On December 11, 1946, the General Assembly of
the United Nations adopted three Resolutions. By the first one,
the General Assembly established the Committee on the Pro-
gressive Development of International Law and its Codifica-
tion.2' By the second one, it directed the Committee:
to treat as a matter of primary importance plans for the for-
mulation, in the context of a general codification of offences
against the peace and security of mankind, or of an Interna-
tional Criminal Code, of the principles recognized in the
Charter of the Nfirnberg Tribunal and in thejudgment of the
Tribunal.22
The third resolution affirmed that genocide was a crime under
international law and asked the Economic and Social Council to
"undertake the necessary studies, with a view to drawing up a
draft convention on the crime of genocide."23
Regarding the first two resolutions, the ILC met for the first
time in 1949. On its agenda was, inter alia, the draft Code of
18. See generally FERENCZ, supra note 17, at 79.
19. See The TokyoJudgment, Volume II, Extracts of Opinion of Mr. Justice R'ling and Mr.
Justice Pal (B.V.A. R1ing & C.F. Rfiter eds., 1977) [hereinafter Extracts], reprinted in
FERENCZ, supra note 17, at 507-38; see also FERENCZ, supra note 17, at 80-83.
20. See Extracts, supra note 19, at 507-38.
21. Progressive Development of International Law and Codification, G.A. Res. 94 (I),
U.N. GAOR, 1st Sess., 55th plen. mtg. (1946). A year later this Committee was trans-
formed into the International Law Commission pursuant to General Assembly Resolu-
tion 174 (II) of November 21, 1947.
22. Affirmation of the Principles of International Law recognized by the Charter of the Nzirn-
berg Tribunal, G.A. Res. 95 (I), U.N. GAOR, 1st Sess., 55th plen. mtg. (1946).
23. The Crime of Genocide, G.A. Res. 96 (I), U.N. GAOR, 1st Sess., 55th plen. mtg.
(1946). The Economic and Social Council actively implemented its mandate to elabo-
rate a Genocide Convention in less than two .years. The Genocide Convention defines
the crime of genocide and makes it clear that it is an international crime whether com-
mitted in time of war or time of peace.
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Offences Against the Peace and Security of Mankind-including
the formulation of the Nuremberg principles. On the basis of
the reports of the Special Rapporteur, the Commission at its sec-
ond session, in 1950, adopted a formulation of the principles of
international law recognized in the Charter of the Nuremberg
Tribunal and in the Judgment of the Tribunal and submitted
these principles to the General Assembly. In 1954, it submitted a
Draft Code of Offences Against the Peace and Security to the
General Assembly. The General Assembly, considering that the
Draft Code of Offences against the Peace and Security of Man-
kind as formulated by the Commission raised problems closely
related to those of the definition of aggression and also consid-
ering that the General Assembly had entrusted a Special Com-
mittee with the task of preparing a report on a draft definition of
aggression, decided to postpone consideration of the draft code
until the Special Committee had submitted its report. 24
Discussions of the definition of aggression lingered on at
successive Special Committees for twenty years. Finally, by reso-
lution 3314 (XXIX) of December 14, 1974, the General Assem-
bly managed to adopt by consensus a Definition of Aggression. 25
Article 1 contains a generic provision, partially drawn from arti-
cle 2(4) of the Charter, which stipulates that:
Aggression is the use of armed force by a State against the
sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of
another State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the
Charter of the United Nations, as set out in this Definition. 26
Article 2 stipulates that "[t]he first use of armed force by a State
in contravention of the Charter shall constitute prima facie evi-
dence of an act of aggression although the Security Council...
may conclude that a determination that an act of aggression has
been committed would not be justified in the light of other rele-
vant circumstances."2
7
In article 3 of the Definition, a number of acts that consti-
tute aggression are enumerated..28 However, this list is not ex-
haustive, the Security Council is not bound by it, and the Secur-
24. For a history of the Draft Code of Crimes, see ILC Report, supra note 10, at 23.
25. Definition, supra note 9.
26. Id. Annex, art. 1.
27. Id. Annex, art. 2.
28. See id. Annex, art. 3. Article 3 provides in pertinent part:
Any of the following acts . .. qualify as an act of aggression:
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ity Council may also consider any other act as an act of aggres-
sion under the provisions of the Charter.29
Finally, article 5, paragraph 2, stipulates that: "A war of ag-
gression is a crime against international peace. Aggression gives
rise to international responsibility.""°
2. The Proposals
a. "Generic" vs. "List" Approach
Taking into account the precedents, there are two main
schools of thoughts at the PrepCom: the "generic approach"
that proposes a general or abstract definition and the "list ap-
proach," which enumerates the specific acts constituting aggres-
sion. Under the generic approach, there is a proposal that fol-
lows the Nuremberg Charter closely in that it criminalizes a "war
of aggression. '"31 Its proponents underline the importance of
the Nuremberg Charter, which they consider to be the only au-
thoritative text in international law, being the only one that es-
tablished and actually recognized individual criminal responsi-
bility. An argument against the definition contained in the Nu-
(a) The invasion or attack by the armed forces of a State of a territory of
another State;
(b) Bombardment by the armed forces of a State against the territory of an-
other State;
(c) The blockade of the ports or coasts of a State by the armed forces of an-
other State;
(d) An attack by the armed forces of a State on the land, sea or air forces of
another State;
(e) The use of armed forces of one State which are within the territory of
another State with the agreement of the receiving State, in contravention
of the conditions provided for in the agreement;
(f) The action of a State in allowing its territory, which it has placed at the
disposal of another State, to be used by that other State for perpetrating
an act of aggression against a third State;
(g) The sending by or on behalf of a State of armed bands, groups, irregulars
or mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed force against another State.
Id.
29. See id. Annex, art. 4.
30. Id. Annex, art. 5, para. 2.
31. The Proposal incorporated in the Consolidated Text of Proposals on the crime
of aggression prepared by the coordinator as Option 2 is the closest one to the Nurem-
berg Charter. See Consolidated Text by Coordinator, supra note 6, at 14, Option 2. It states:
"For the purposes of the present Statute and subject to a prior determination by the
United Nations Security Council of an act of aggression by the State concerned, the
crime of aggression means any of the following- acts: planning, preparing, initiating,
carrying out a war of aggression." Id.
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remberg Charter is that the concept of "war of aggression"
relates to a past war and does not apply to most forms of contem-
porary violence. From a more technical point of view, there
have been objections that this definition is a circular one, a
"non-definition" that would hardly satisfy today's more stringent
standards of legality. Consequently, within the same generic ap-
proach, other proposals contemplate definitions that draw their
inspiration from Article 1 of Resolution 3314 and Article 2(4) of
the U.N. Charter in order to expand the concept of the defini-
tion to other types of illicit uses of force.3 2
Opposing or supplementing the generic approach, other
delegations insist on the need of having a definition that would
enumerate the list of acts constituting aggression. This list,
they claim, should reproduce the one contained in Resolution
3314 which was adopted by consensus after many years of exten-
sive negotiations and reflect customary international law. Those
who object maintain that this Resolution was aimed at acts of
States and not crimes of individuals. This is, they argue, demon-
strated not only by the legislative history, but by the text of the
resolution itself, including Article 5(2), which draws a distinc-
tion between the war of aggression qualified as a "crime against
international peace" and the act of aggression which "gives rise to
international responsibility."34
Taking into account this seemingly irreconcilable division,
during the discussions, the possibility of combining these alter-
native approaches in a single definition that would contain both
an introductory paragraph of general nature followed by a list of
specific acts that constitute the offense has been proposed. Ob-
viously, even if this compromise were to be accepted, it would
not in itself constitute a sufficient response to the real challenge
of agreeing on the content of each part of the text.
32. See, e.g., Consolidated Text by Coordinator, supra note 6, at 13, Option 1. Option 1
states:
For the purposes of the present Statute, [and subject to the determination of
the Security Council regarding the act of a State,] the crime of aggression
means [the use of armed force, including the initiation thereof, by an individ-
ual who is in a position of exercising control or directing the political or mili-
tary action of a State, against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political
independence of a State in violation of the Charter of the United Nations.]
Id. (brackets in original).
33. See id. Option 1, Variation 3.
34. Definition, supra note 9, art. 5, para. 2 (emphasis added).
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b. Crime of Aggression vs. Act of Aggression
Regardless of the approach taken, during discussions there
seemed to be a common understanding that finding a solution
to the problem required taking account of two different types of
responsibilities, that of the State for the commission of an act of
aggression and the responsibility of an individual for committing
the crime of aggression. Drawing on this common understand-
ing, a proposal was introduced at the last session of the PrepCom
that distinguished both concepts in the definition itself. The
proposal contained two paragraphs; one defining the act of ag-
gression and the other defining the crime, both for the purposes
of the Rome Statute.35 This proposal was welcomed by many as
an important step forward, at least from a methodological point
of view. However, some delegations expressed the opinion that
the Working Group should focus exclusively on drafting a defini-
tion of the crime of aggression.
c. The "Threshold"
Despite the fundamental disagreement among delegations
surrounding the definition, all have recognized that to fall
under the definition of aggression the use of force should be of
a certain magnitude or gravity. Uses of force of lesser magnitude
that continue to occur, sometimes even quite frequently, such as
border skirmishes, cross-border artillery, armed incursions, and
similar situations should not fall under the definition of aggres-
sion. In this context, it has been argued that the Charter itself
does not consider any act of force contrary to its provisions as an
act of aggression. Furthermore, acts of force of lesser gravity
would not fall within the jurisdiction of the ICC, which only ap-
plies to the "most serious crimes of concern to the international
35. Proposal Submitted by Bosnia and Herzegovina, New Zealand and Romania, Definition
of the crime of aggression, U.N. Doc. PCNICC/2001/WGCA/DP.2 (Aug. 27, 2001) [here-
inafter Bosnia Proposal]. The definition is divided as follows:
1. A person commits the crime of aggression who, being in a position to exer-
cise control over or direct the political or military action of a State, inten-
tionally and knowingly orders or participates actively in the planning, prep-
aration, initiation or waging of aggression committed by that State.
2. For the purposes of the exercise ofjurisdiction by the Court over the crime
of aggression under the Statute, aggression committed by a State means the
use of armed force to attack the territorial integrity or political indepen-
dence or another State in violation of the Charter of the United Nations.
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community as a whole."36 . Consequently, delegations have, in-
creasingly focused on the issue of the "threshold," or, in other
words, the scale, magnitude, or gravity required for an act of use
of force to amount to aggression. In this respect, some formula-
tions have been proposed. Some delegations suggest that the
threshold requirement can be created by qualifying the violation
of the norm (e.g., use of force in "manifest" violation of the U.N.
Charter)." Others suggest qualifying the acts by their conse-
quences or goals (e.g., only acts of force that have the object or
the result in an annexations or occupation of territories would
be covered).38 Finally, some delegations refer back to the Nu-
remberg Charter, arguing that the "war of aggression" has a
threshold built in the concept that indicates the scale of violence
that is required.
The legislative history of the definitions of other crimes
within the jurisdiction of the Court demonstrates the fundamen-
tal importance of finding the right "threshold" in order to reach
agreement,39 and it will probably be instrumental to the defini-
tion of aggression as well.
d. A Leadership Crime
The proposals introduced so far seem to share a common
assumption that only leaders of a State can be criminally held
responsible of the crime of aggression. However, for some, this
common understanding needs to be accounted for either in the
definition itself or in the elements. A list of the category of per-
sons involved should be agreed upon to satisfy the principle of
legality. Individuals need to know ex ante whether they actually
belong to a category of persons that could be individually re-
sponsible of the crime of aggression. It could be very difficult to
draw the line between policy makers and mere executioners, in
particular in a democratic society, where a large number of per-
sons belonging to different agencies of the Executive and of Par-
36. Rome Statute, supra note 1, pmbl.
37. See Consolidated Text by Coordinator, supra note 6, at 13, Option 1, Variation 2.
38. See id.
39. See generally von Hebel & Robinson, supra note 12, at 79-126. The chapeau of
Article 7 of the Rome Statute contains the "threshold" for crimes against humanity
while the chapeau of Article 8 contains a non-mandatory "threshold" for war crimes. See
Rome Statute, supra note 1, arts. 7-8.
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liament (or even to key economic sectors of, a State), could be
involved in preparing and shaping a decision.
II. THE CONDITIONS OF EXERCISE OFJURISDICTION BY
THE COURT
Although it is not expressly said either in article 5 of the
Rome Statute or in Resolution F, it is clear that the conditions of
exercise of jurisdiction require discussing the links, if any, be-
tween the Court and the Security Council. The articulation of
an adequate relationship with the Security Council was one the
most sensitive issues during the drafting of the Rome Statute.
The relevant provisions, in particular article 16 of the Statute,
continue to elicit controversy and criticism today.4 ° The choice
of an elliptical construction in Article 5 to describe the problem
with regard to aggression, shows in itself the degree of disagree-
ment that existed on this matter at the end of the Diplomatic
Conference. For those who opposed recognizing any role of the
Security Council, any express mention to the Council in Article 5
would have been unacceptable. Therefore, Article 5 only refers
to the need for: "setting out the conditions under which the
Court shall exercise jurisdiction with respect to this crime. Such
provisions shall be consistent with the relevant provisions of the
Charter of the United Nations."41
Quite obviously, all delegations agree that the conditions of
exercise of jurisdiction by the Court should be consistent with
the Charter of the United Nations. But the interpretations of
the Charter vary dramatically and its provisions have been in-
voked to sustain opposite views.
A. The Provisions of the U.N. Charter: A Brief Overview
The U.N. Charter prohibits the use of force, with a few ex-
ceptions, notably self-defense and authorizations by the Security
Council. Article 2(4) states that: "All members shall refrain in
their international relations from the threat or use of force
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any
40. For a discussion of the role of the Security Council, see Lionel Yee, The Interna-
tional Criminal Court and the Security Council: Articles 13(b) and 16, in THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT: THE MAKING OF THE ROME STATUTE, ISSUES, NEGOTIATIONS, RESULTS
143-52 (Roy S. Lee ed., 1999).
41. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 5, para. 2.
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state or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of
the United Nations. "42
This article creates a duty to refrain from the threat or use
of force and, consequently, implies that there is international re-
sponsibility if the State does not comply with it. It does not give
guidance as to the type of international responsibility that would
apply to the individuals who perpetrated the acts leading to ag-
gression.
Articles 10, 11, and 12 regulate the powers of the General
Assembly to discuss and make recommendations concerning the
threat or use of force. Article 10 states that the General Assem-
bly may "discuss any questions or any matters within the scope of
the present Charter. ''4 ' Article 11 states that the General Assem-
bly may "discuss any questions relating to the maintenance of
international peace and security ... and, except as provided in
Article 12, may make recommendations with regard to any such
questions."44 Finally, Article 12(1) provides that" [w] hile the Se-
curity Council is exercising in respect of any dispute or situation
the functions assigned to it in the present Charter, the General
Assembly shall not make any recommendation with regard to
that dispute or situation unless the Security Council so re-
quests."45 Therefore, these provisions assign responsibilities to
the General Assembly for discussing and making recommenda-
tions concerning the maintenance of international peace and se-
curity except when the Security Council is exercising its powers
concerning that dispute.
With respect to the Security Council, Article 24 states that
[i]n order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United
Nations, its members confer on the Security Council primary re-
sponsibility for the maintenance of international peace and se-
curity"4 6 and that " [i] n discharging these duties the Security
Council shall act in accordance with the Purposes and Principles
of the United Nations. The specific powers granted to the Se-
curity Council for the discharge of these duties are laid down in
Chapters VI, VII, VIII and XII."4 7
42. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4.
43. Id. art. 10.
44. Id. art. 11, para. 2.
45. Id. art. 12, para. 1.
46. Id. art. 24, para. 1.
47. Id. art. 24, para. 2.
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Further on, the U.N. Charter addresses this issue in Chapter
VII under the title, "Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace,
Breaches. of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression."48 The U.N.
Charter states in Article 39 that "[t] he Security Council shall de-
termine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the
peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or
decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles
41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and secur-
ity."49
Finally, the U.N. Charter assigns both contentious and con-
sultative functions to the International Court ofJustice ("ICJ")."°
The Statute of the ICJ considers the Court competent for any
legal disputes between parties which have accepted its jurisdic-
tion, concerning: "a) the interpretation of a treaty, b) any ques-
tion of international law, c) the existence of any fact which, if
established, would constitute a breach of an international obliga-
tion, [and] d) the nature or extent of the reparation to be made
for the breach of an international obligation."5 1
As for the consultative competence, Article 96 states that
both the General Assembly and the Security Council may re-
quest an advisory opinion from the ICJ on any legal question
and that the other organs and specialized agencies, with previ-
ous authorization by the General Assembly, may request advisory
opinions of the ICJ on legal questions arising within the scope of
their activities. 5 2
B. Positions in the Working Group
Faced with these provisions of the U.N. Charter, the argu-
ments and proposals in the Working Group of the Preparatory
Commission have covered a wide range of positions.
On the one hand there are those who assert that the Secur-
ity Council has the exclusive power to determine an act of ag-
gression by a State, which, in their view, is an indispensable pre-
condition for the determination of individual criminal responsi-
48. Id. ch. VII.
49. Id. art. 39.
50. See id. art. 94, 96.
51. Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 36, para. 2, 59
Stat. 1055, 3 Bevans 1179, available at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/ibasicdocuments/
ibasictext/ibasicstatute.htm.
52. U.N. CHARTER art. 96.
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bility by the Court.53 This position is mainly based on Article 39
of the U.N. Charter, which assigns responsibilities to the Security
Council in determining when a State has committed aggres-
sion.5 4 This position was also held by the ILC, which considered
that the Security Council's special responsibilities under Chapter
VII of the Charter, mean "that special provision should be made
to ensure that prosecutions are brought for aggression only if
the Security Council first determines that the State in question
has committed aggression in circumstances involving the crime
of aggression which is the subject of the charge. 55
The ILC Draft Statute contained a provision to that effect
stating: "A complaint ,of or directly related to an act of aggres-
sion may not be brought under this Statute unless the Security
Council has first determined that a State has committed the act
of aggression which is the subject of the complaint. 56
The exclusivity of the Security Council to determine an act
of aggression is contested by those who underline the fact that
the U.N. Charter assigns competence in the area of the mainte-
nance of peace and security to several organs. They add that the
Security Council's exclusivity lies solely in the capacity of taking
"action" through the imposition of sanctions, be they of an
armed or non-armed character. 57 Finally, they argue that the Se-
curity Council has no role at all in this matter since their compe-
tencies relate exclusively to States and not to individual criminal
responsibility, and because the determination of aggression of a
State is a legal question that was assigned to the Council by the
U.N. Charter only for the purposes of applying sanctions. There
is, they conclude, no competence on individual criminal respon-
sibility assigned to the Security Council by the Charter and,
therefore, the conditions for the exercise of this jurisdiction lie
solely in the ICC. From a practical perspective they emphasize
that practice has shown that the record of the Security Council
in stating that a situation is one of aggression is, at best, sporadic.
The Security Council, they argue, has shown over the years its
resistance to determine the existence of an act of aggression for
several reasons, including the paralyzing effect of the veto power
53. See Consolidated Text by. Coordinator, supra note 6, at 15-16, Option 1, 3.
54. U.N. CHARTER art. 39.
55. Draft Statute, supra note 7, at 72.
56. Id. at 84.
57. U.N. CHARTER ch. VII.
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of the permanent members. They conclude that the Security
Council has no role in the determination of individual criminal
responsibility or at best only primary, but not exclusive, compe-
tence in this field as is expressly stated in Article 24. From a
practical perspective they insist that a failure of this organ to ful-
fill its responsibility cannot render the jurisdiction of the ICC
inoperative and nonexistent in practice.
The view that the Security Council has a primary, but not
exclusive, role in the matter has prompted several proposals
which have a common point of departure, but radically different
solutions. Most of these proposals seem to accept at least two
premises. Firstly, that a determination of an act of aggression is
a precondition for the Court to exercise its functions over the
crime of aggression. Secondly, that the Security Council has the
right to be the organ that acts in the first place, providing for
other alternatives only as a remedy when the Council fails to act
after a certain period of time or does not use the faculty already
recognized in Article 16 to suspend proceedings by the Court.
As to the remedies for Council inaction, the proposals pro-
vide for a wide range of options leaving the determination of an
act of aggression either to the International Criminal Court it-
self,5" to the General Assembly"9 or-to a mix ofjudicial and polit-
ical organs, namely the General Assembly and the International
Court of Justice acting within its consultative jurisdiction.60
CONCLUSION
Discussions during and after Rome demonstrate that there
is no easy solution to any of the problems raised. In light of the
difficulties to be faced, some continue to argue that aggression
should have never been included in the Statute in the first place.
Whether they are right or wrong is irrelevant today. The Statute
has been adopted and will soon enter into force. The interna-
tional community needs now to act upon decisions that were
made at the Rome Conference both to include the crime and to
mandate the PrepCom to draft proposals with the view of imple-
menting this inclusion at a review conference. All those who
58. See Consolidated Text by Coordinator, supra note 6, at 15-16, Option 1, Variation 1,
and Option 2.
59. See id. at 15-16, Option 1, Variation 2.
60. See Bosnia Proposal, supra note 35.
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promote the establishment of a universal Court, regardless of
their position with regard to the crime of aggression, are re-
quired to negotiate in good faith in order to seek an adequate
answer to the problem. Failure to do so could undermine the
credibility of the process and weaken support for the Court.
It should be quite clear by now that there will be no quick
"fix" to the issues involved, since it will be essential for any solu-
tion to be very widely accepted. This is a political must that has
been transformed into a legal obligation by Article 5, which re-
quires a provision on aggression to be adopted in accordance
with Articles 121 and 123.61 These Articles provide for a cumber-
some amendment process. An amendment would have to be
voted in favor by a two-third majority of States Parties at a review
conference to be convened seven years after the entry into force
of the Statute.62 This amendment will enter into force only if it
is ratified by seven-eighths of them, but, even then, it will not
enter into force in respect of those who have not accepted the
amendment.6 3 Taking into account this procedure it is clear
that for a formulation to see the light, delegations will need to
deploy all efforts to persuade and convince. The constructive
atmosphere that has started to prevail during discussions at the
Preparatory Commission should be maintained if any progress is
to be made in this matter.
Despite the fact that debates generate at times a frustrating
sense of d6'd vu, the analysis is far from being exhausted and
some technical issues need to be explored further. There is no
justification to abandon, with respect to the crime of aggression,
the stringent standards of legality that were applied to the defini-
tion of other crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court. The
crime of aggression should not be treated differently than any
other crime and regardless of the approach finally pursued-
generic, list, or mixed approach-the definition will need to
identify both the actus reus and the mens rea with adequate preci-
sion. Precisely because of the political nature of the issues in-
volved, every effort should be made not to depart from the prin-
ciple of legality, which should be perceived not only as a safe-
61. See Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 5, para. 2.
62. See id. art. 121.
63. See id.
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guard for the rights, of the accused but the best protection for
the credibility of the Court as well.,
The conditions for exercise ofjurisdiction over the crime of
aggression raise not only thorny political difficulties, but also
technical problems that need to be addressed. From the latter
perspective, it is important to recognize that a predetermination
of an act of aggression-by whatever organ-could have a tre-
mendous impact on the criminal proceedings. The impact and
the consequences for the ICC itself and for the rights of the ac-
cused need to be discussed further, in particular the defenses
that that person could invoke in light of a predetermination of
the act, and taking into account that the person would not only
be linked to the State, but be considered, by definition, one of
its leaders.
In conclusion, it should be remembered that proposals on
aggression are to be drafted only for the purposes of the ICC, an
institution created with the important but sole objective of deter-
mining the individual criminal responsibility of perpetrators of
grave crimes of international concern.
20021 605
